


# Strategy Research Project

## Building Efficient and Effective Strategic Intelligence Teams

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Marti  
United States Army



United States Army War College  
Class of 2012

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# USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **BUILDING EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE TEAMS**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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## BUILDING EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TEAMS

In war as in business, surprise can be a powerful strategic weapon. Parallels exist between military and business planning, and the role of intelligence and counterintelligence in achieving and preempting surprise. Sherman Kent defined strategic intelligence as the "kind of knowledge a state must possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its causes will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and soldiers plan and act in ignorance." With one or two word changes, this definition could apply equally well to the world of business. In competitive, high-velocity markets, ignorance of other players' actions or of developments in the wider business environment can prove costly.<sup>1</sup>

—Carol E.B. Choksy,  
Indiana University Bloomington

During the Cold War, strategic intelligence agencies did not conduct seamless information sharing and integration to track and count thousands of military targets positioned by the Soviet Union and other state adversaries. Each strategic intelligence agency focused on its specialized mission, acquiring its own information and then sharing via formal, finished reports. These efforts were not synchronized to support a common purpose. The end of the Cold War should have brought a revolution in intelligence requirements and capabilities. Monolith enemies with large standing militaries like the Soviet Union gave way to non-state enemies who possessed limited military capability, but were resourceful and efficient in how they employed lethal capability against United States interests. Our nation's strategic intelligence agencies should have quickly shifted their practices and information sharing techniques to meet this new strategic intelligence challenge. Instead, intelligence resources, practices and procedures shifted at an incremental pace and were not sufficient to predict the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001(9/11).

The 9/11 attacks increased the urgency by which change needed to occur in our strategic intelligence agencies. Strategic leader interest and funding increased to support the urgency for change, but efficiency and effectiveness did not proportionally change. It has been over 10 years since the 9/11 attacks. A decade of fighting terrorism has weakened our nation's economy. The demand for strategic intelligence continues to increase, but fiscal constraints threaten our ability to increase our strategic intelligence capabilities. This paper discusses how we can increase strategic intelligence capability by focusing efforts on efficiency and without sacrificing effectiveness.

An increasingly complex global operating environment and challenging fiscal environment for the United States Government does not have to translate to a diminished ability to accurately predict the future environment. Essential to sustaining or increasing U.S. strategic intelligence capability is developing environments of innovativeness, flexibility, creativity and efficiency in our national intelligence agencies. The specific focus should be on our intelligence analysis teams and the human resources departments which select people to make up these teams. Our strategic intelligence analysis teams do not need to necessarily grow, but do need to become more efficient in employing the people and technology in current strategic intelligence team structures without losing effectiveness.

National intelligence agencies should increase efforts to create organizational cultures which stress strong leadership and emphasis on people. With people as the central theme, human resources departments should leverage personality indicator tools such as the Myer's Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) as an additional means to select

and train intelligence analysts. The goal is to match leaders with vision and skilled analysts, maximizing various personality types to achieve a healthy analytic environment which is innovative, flexible, and creative. The additional effort to select the right people will result in less personnel or personality based friction in our intelligence teams, allowing leaders and analysts to focus efforts on conducting intelligence analysis and sharing information across the national intelligence agencies.

To sustain or increase the longevity and effectiveness of these surgically formed teams, national intelligence organizations need to reexamine how to support career long professional development of leaders and analysts. Continued professional development needs to encompass advanced leadership, technical and interagency education opportunities. The analysts need to believe the organization wants them to succeed as individuals as well as members of an analytic team; this belief will likely increase their desire to commit and stay in the organization, resulting in a high, long term return on the organization's initial investment in selecting and training the individual analyst.

In building efficient and effective strategic intelligence teams, it is important to understand what our future global operating environment might look like as well as how our past strategic intelligence environment has shaped our current disposition. The need to accurately predict and shape these environments creates the demand for efficient and effective strategic intelligence teams. A review of these environments sets the context for recommended change.

#### Demand for Strategic Intelligence: Future Global Operating Environment

George Friedman describes a twenty-first century where the United States is economically, militarily, and politically the dominant superpower and in a geopolitical

struggle with several secondary powers who threaten to form a coalition to contain and control the United States.<sup>2</sup> Friedman believes our government will attempt to preempt the coalescing secondary powers from gaining sufficient strength to challenge the United States.<sup>3</sup> A critical element in maintaining a position of global leadership is the ability to accurately assess other nation's strategic objectives and their strategy to achieve these objectives; assess how they support or conflict with our nation's strategic objectives and strategy; and predict how these converging interests shape the future operating environment. A persistent, complicated, interconnected nature of global relationships and constantly changing and conflicting policy aims of multiple nations is accelerated by twenty-first century technology.

Technology is bringing the world closer together, creating an environment where countries are increasingly co-dependent on one another primarily through energy and economic interests. As co-dependence increases, so does the complexity of determining how global factors influence one another. The nation must work closer with allies and other world partners. It is increasingly difficult for nations to pursue isolationist foreign policies; only considering how such policies affect their own nation. The increased complexity increases the demand for contextual, predictive strategic intelligence analysis of the operational environment.

The demand for strategic intelligence is not a twenty-first century phenomena and can be traced back as long ago as 500 B.C. The military theorist Sun Tzu wrote, "The best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the

enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances.”<sup>4</sup> The application of Sun Tzu's philosophy although specific to waging war in 500 B.C., in a less interconnected and complex world was critical to mitigating the complete destruction of states and their armies. It is certainly applicable to diplomacy between nations at the strategic level today. If Friedman's secondary global powers are attempting to coalesce to mitigate U.S. global dominance, then we must understand other nation's strategic objectives and strategy, so we can disrupt unhealthy alliances against the United States and be more precise with our own objectives and strategies. The need for strategic intelligence clearly existed in 500 B.C. and is more critical for understanding the more complex environment of the twenty-first century. The challenge is how we increase our strategic intelligence capability efficiently without sacrificing effectiveness. If the U.S. Government experiences a fiscal resource constrained environment, we must develop innovative ways to mitigate potential disruption of our ability to meet increasingly complex intelligence requirements.

On 3 January 2012, President Obama published strategic guidance outlining his desire for the United States to sustain its position as a global leader even as “our nation is at a moment of transition.”<sup>5</sup> The President specifies the requirement for intelligence to assist in meeting the challenges in this environmental change by stating, “we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber.”<sup>6</sup> The President's emphasis on intelligence is reflected in the 19<sup>th</sup> century military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz's correlation to intelligence in war, “War

has a way of masking the stage with scenery crudely daubed with fearsome apparitions. Once this is cleared away, and the horizon becomes unobstructed, developments will confirm his earlier convictions...this is one of the great chasms between planning and execution.”<sup>7</sup> In parody to Clausewitz’s view of the relationship to war and intelligence; our nation is currently engaged in a war of conflicting strategic objectives and strategies with multiple nations. In order to win this war, we must create a cogent strategy to achieve our strategic objectives. The plan and its execution must be informed by strategic intelligence constantly in order to refine our strategy and increase the probability of achieving our strategic objectives. In this comparison, President Obama confirms the demand signal for strategic intelligence.

Additionally, the President’s guidance acknowledges we are facing fiscal restraints, indicating the Budget Control Act of 2011 reduces federal spending.<sup>8</sup> Strategic intelligence budget growth is likely to slow, but it does not need to directly translate to slowed growth in capability. U.S. Government strategic intelligence organizations play a large role in describing this environment and predicting how it can be shaped, specifically the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the all-source agencies of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Department of Defense; and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State.

### Current Strategic Intelligence Environment

The strategic intelligence capability we currently possess needs to become more efficient, and the first step towards increasing efficiency is to remember and understand our previous mistakes. The recent strategic inflection point revealing less than optimal performance in U.S. strategic intelligence was the 9/11 attacks. Since the 9/11 attacks

the U.S. strategic intelligence community continues to improve identified intelligence deficiencies regarding national level strategic intelligence organizational structure and practices. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent wars in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); provided opportunity to identify deficiencies, and test improved procedures and concepts. The 9/11 Commission Report, initiated by Congress and the President on November 27, 2002, identified several unity of effort deficiencies.<sup>9</sup> These deficiencies can be summarized as structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work; a lack of common standards and practices across intelligence agencies; a divided management of intelligence capabilities within the national intelligence community; a degraded capacity to set priorities and too many jobs required to accomplish the priorities; and the structure was too complex and secretive to be efficient and effective.<sup>10</sup> What was lacking to comprehensively address these identified deficiencies was an overarching national intelligence directorate.

The ODNI was developed in response to 9/11 Commission recommendations; specifically to create unity of effort across the fifteen U.S. Government intelligence organizations. Since the creation of the ODNI there is marked progress in all unity of effort areas, but progress has primarily occurred because of a common purpose or interest across the fifteen agencies, which is to strengthen national security and inform policymakers on national intelligence strategy. What ODNI has not optimally achieved is setting enforceable intelligence personnel policies; establishing common standards for intelligence education and training; establishing standards for information and intelligence sharing, including technology policies relating to information sharing; and

establishing policies for security of information.<sup>11</sup> The obstacle to ODNI effectiveness is empowerment, as the sixteen national intelligence agencies are not mandated to take directives from the ODNI. This shortcoming was specifically highlighted in a December 16, 2011, Congressional Research Service Report, Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities:<sup>12</sup>

In April 2007, then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Michael McConnell reportedly told a conference of federal officials that he lacked sufficient authority to lead the 16-agency intelligence community, citing his lack of direct line management authority over every intelligence agency except CIA, because each was a part of another cabinet-level department. In doing so, McConnell conceded that the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act had “significantly clarified and strengthened DNI authorities,” but that intelligence community leadership had “not fully defined those authorities in guidance” to the intelligence community.

In September 2010, the House and Senate passed intelligence authorization legislation for FY2010 and the bill was signed by the President on October 7, 2010. This legislation significantly increased the means by which the DNI execute his authorities:<sup>13</sup>

Principally, the act provided that the DNI can undertake accountability reviews of individual intelligence agencies as well as assessing appropriate personnel levels. He is to conduct initial vulnerability assessments of each major new system, review changes in acquisition costs, and terminate programs unless they are essential as set forth in assessment forwarded to Congress. The DNI is also to submit budget projections, Future Years Intelligence Plans in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget. Taken together, these new provisions give the DNI greater management authorities over the entire Intelligence Community by supplementing provisions of the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act.

The unifying effect of being a nation at war continues to incrementally translate into enforceable unity of effort policies and standards by which all national intelligence agencies must follow in order to efficiently and effectively support the President's Strategic Guidance.



All 9/11 Commission unity of effort deficiencies regarding strategic intelligence are critical, but the deficiencies impacting our capability the most, and not specifically addressed in 2010 Intelligence Authorization Legislation, are those regarding human resource policies, education and training. These policies should be the highest priority. Improvements in these areas first are the foundation national intelligence agencies can embark from to improve other unity of effort deficiencies. The nation's priority of intelligence resourcing should focus on selecting and developing strategic intelligence leaders, establishing positive organizational culture and developing innovative, creative and flexible intelligence analysis teams. Without strong intelligence teams, information sharing and technology cannot be fully leveraged. It is in this area that we can achieve some of the greatest efficiency and increase our effectiveness at the same time.

#### Establishing Leadership and Culture in the Strategic Intelligence Organization

Strategic intelligence organizations need to instill confidence in the nation's senior strategic leaders. The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that the national intelligence community was not an optimal learning organization. The strategic leaders of our national intelligence agencies had not transitioned organizational cultures quickly enough from cold war era, stove-pipe, hierarchical methodologies and human resource practices to meet the challenge of asymmetric threats which were more flexible and innovative than our cold war enemies. As a result, the 9/11 attacks and the aftermath created was largely unpredicted and the national intelligence community has been attempting to regain the trust of our senior strategic leaders ever since. Without this trust and a credible strategic intelligence apparatus to inform our strategies, our nation faces increased risk in achieving our strategic objectives.

The start point to regaining this trust is the demonstration of strategic leadership across our national intelligence organizations, and as strategic intelligence analysis is provided to the nation's senior leaders, a positive, professional strategic culture should permeate the verbal or written delivery of the analysis. A creative, cohesive, efficient, effective and sustainable strategic intelligence organization requires its leaders to understand several strategic leader concepts and use the most effective combination of the concepts in formulating strategic intelligence teams and executing a long term intelligence vision and strategy. Effectively communicating the vision and strategy, understanding the people in the organization, establishing a positive climate, and knowing when change is appropriate are four of the most critical strategic leader concepts when developing strategic intelligence teams. A strategic leader's application of these concepts may strengthen an organization's current culture if the concepts are currently in practice, or gradually change the organization's culture if the concepts are not currently resident.

The following process in developing strategic intelligence leader philosophy and vision serves as a template for national intelligence agencies to develop cohesive, effective and sustainable strategic intelligence organizations. The philosophy and vision is intended to be succinct and easy for all audiences to understand. When internalized and reiterated throughout the organization and through all extended external audiences, there is no strategic intelligence requirement or challenge the organization cannot support.

The first concept to examine in developing a philosophy and vision for a strategic intelligence organization is the consideration of human terrain in the organization. Who

composes the work force? What is the demographic? Is it a junior work force...is it a senior workforce? Not all national level intelligence organizations contain the same demographic. It is important to know the human dimension of the organization so you can assess their expectations, understand their issues and develop a relationship with them.<sup>14</sup> The strategic leader's philosophy and vision may be the first opportunity the leader has to establish an initial relationship. It is important to reinforce that an organization is going to take care of its people, function as a team, and keep communication open. The concept of analyzing the human terrain also supports the strategic intelligence leader interpersonal competency, and is a building block for consensus building.<sup>15</sup> Building consensus across several national intelligence agencies is a skill leveraged daily in team building and in developing national intelligence. Once the human terrain is identified and the content of the philosophy and vision tailored to the audience, it is critical to effectively communicate it.

In a strategic philosophy and vision, it is important to communicate it in a style easy to understand and be repeated inside and outside the organization.<sup>16</sup> The message can be delivered in short one liners or prose, so that in high pressure environments it is remembered despite exhaustion. As much as it is important for the people in a strategic intelligence organization to understand the strategic leader's philosophy and vision, it is equally important for external audiences to know what you are trying to achieve. A clear conveyance of a strategic intelligence philosophy and vision to external audiences may impact the initiation or longevity of a relationship between national intelligence organizations or audiences of their analysis. An additional factor in crafting a strategic intelligence leader philosophy or vision is awareness of the

leader climate and culture of the organization during the tenure of the strategic leader's predecessor.

If organizational cultural and leader climate are positive prior to assuming control of a strategic intelligence organization, the new leader may want to spend more time understanding the nuances of the organization and people, and not change too quickly, especially if the organization is cohesive, effective and able to sustain these characteristics. If the organization does not have a positive leader climate or culture, change can be more rapid.<sup>17</sup> Determining when leader climate change or organizational change is necessary is more art than science and should be determined only after talking in depth to people inside the strategic intelligence organization and members of external audiences who regularly collaborate with the organization. Too much change too quick even if warranted can have a negative impact in building an effective, cohesive team. Gauging the right balance for change is a point of departure in maintaining credibility in an organization and strengthening trust.

Integrity and trust are the cornerstones of the organization's interpersonal relationships and foundation of strategic analysis. Trust is built through personal integrity, and permeates into the organization's analytic integrity. Intelligence analysis must be developed with proven techniques and analytic methodologies and delivered with candor and moral courage. The accelerant to building a trustful environment is respect for one another and teamwork. Respect and teamwork are undervalued attributes and are the start point for taking care of one another. All leaders in the organization should be expected to genuinely care for their subordinates. If caring is genuine, all team members will seek to understand each other's strengths, weaknesses,

work and home challenges; and creatively develop ways and means to maximize every person in the organization. All leaders are expected to provide candid, constructive and timely counseling and feedback to their direct subordinates. Subordinates deserve to know where they stand and how leaders are going to help them achieve success. Bottom line, when analysts succeed, the organization succeeds. The strategic intelligence leader needs to establish organizational priorities as a team, providing maximum flexibility to directorates to organize their time and other resources effectively, based on unity and priority of effort. Protect their time so they can build their teams while accomplishing organizational objectives.

#### Developing the Strategic Intelligence Team

In a fiscal resource constrained environment, efficiency with the capabilities you possess does not have to translate to less effectiveness. It means strategic intelligence organizations must be innovative and flexible in structure and execution of core functions and must increase collaborative efforts internally and with external agencies. It does not mean doing more with less, it means doing better with the same. The key element is the analytic work force. Intelligence analysis teams should maximize individual's cognitive abilities, technical skills, creativity, problem solving, and personality factors to obtain the right combinations of people working in concert. Human resource departments generally screen and select the strategic intelligence work force based on possession of cognitive and technical skills:

- Thinking, reasoning and remembering
- Writing, research and speaking abilities

Where they fall short in their selection criteria is in screening for creativity, problem solving and personality factors.

To gain maximum understanding of the work force we should assess personality types, assisting intelligence analysts in increasing self-awareness and understanding how their actions impact others. An effective tool in gaining this useful understanding is the Myer's Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). Developed by psychologist Carl Jung, Isabel Briggs Myers and Katharine Cook Briggs, the instrument is designed to identify different personality types that can be used to describe people and their interaction with others.<sup>18</sup>

Personality type theory is founded upon the work of Jung. The MBTI is intended to be an inventory of basic preferences rather than a measure of traits. It is a forced-choice, self-report instrument, designed for administration by qualified professionals and intended for use with normal subjects. The instrument has been tested extensively for validity and reliability. It has become the most widely used instrument for non-psychiatric populations and has been used extensively in business.<sup>19</sup>

If the organizations leaders and analysts are open regarding the instruments utility, its usefulness can contribute to nine critical organization functions:<sup>20</sup>

- Conduct meetings more effectively
- Match individual potential with job requirements
- Resolve conflicts more quickly and effectively
- Improve interviewing skills
- Negotiate ethical differences
- Break work-flow bottlenecks
- Set more realistic and more widely accepted organizational goals

- Reduce stress levels
- Meet deadlines better

Matching complimentary personality types and cognitive skills on intelligence teams will create a more productive and creative analytic environment, likely translating to more thoughtful and complete intelligence assessments. By improving your understanding of the needs and behavioral preferences of people in your work life, you can harness the rich differences of the people within your organization.<sup>21</sup>

A 1997 Eastern Carolina University study reinforces the assertion that certain combinations of personality types on teams, impacts the performance of the team.<sup>22</sup> The case study of two software development teams used MBTI data of team members and tracked their performance on assignments of comparable complexity. The team with complimentary MBTI attributes finished the assignment ahead of schedule and produced a high quality system. The team with MBTI attributes which were not complimentary took twice as long to finish the assignment and the project required several major revisions.<sup>23</sup> Team composition of personality types does appear to be an important explanatory variable for differences in team performance. The literature and this case example suggest that in general, diversity and balance in team member personality types is needed to produce successful team performance.<sup>24</sup> Once the right combinations of analysts are teamed, it is critical to ensure they are trained with the proper analyst tools, professionally referred to as analytic tradecraft and basic structured analytic techniques.

Most entry level strategic intelligence analysts do not enter employment into national intelligence agencies with developed advanced intelligence analysis skills. As

intelligence teams are formed, it is important to ensure analysts experienced in current advanced intelligence analysis skills are part of each team in order to assist in mentoring inexperienced analysts while ensuring team analysis meets a rigorous process known as analytic tradecraft. “Analytic tradecraft is the practiced skill of applying techniques and methodologies appropriate to an issue to mitigate bias, gain insight, and provide persuasive understanding of the issue to members of the U.S. Government and its allies.”<sup>25</sup> Concurrently, the new, inexperienced analysts should be required and provided adequate time to attend entry level intelligence analysis courses to ensure an initial foundation is established. The new analyst must feel prepared to contribute competently as a new member of an intelligence analysis team, commit to the organization’s philosophy, vision, and seek strategic intelligence as their profession. Professionals require years of study and practice before they are capable of expert work. Thus, a deep moral obligation rests on the profession, and its professionals, to continuously develop expertise and use that expertise only in the best interests of society, professionals are actually servants.<sup>26</sup> Positive organizational leadership support for this commitment establishes the culture for career long academic learning to the profession of strategic intelligence analysis.

Sustaining the strategic intelligence team environment once built is perhaps the most challenging over the long run. It is challenging because people are a fleeting resource. It is rare for strategic intelligence analysts to stay in their field for a 30-year career, meaning there are frequent turnover of expertise in all strategic intelligence agencies. Sustaining our strategic intelligence analyst capability requires a long-term maintenance plan, balancing retention of the best analysts across the breadth of



experience and encouraging them to commit to a life of learning academically and technically as members of the strategic intelligence profession. A sustainment plan should include analyst exchange programs across U.S. Government agencies and abroad with international partners. We should strive to diversify the strategic analytic workforce culturally, improving our capacity to view intelligence problems from multiple perspectives, providing more contextual analysis. At the heart of successful workforce sustainment programs are strategic leaders who support and underwrite risk associated with analyst shortages as a result of being a profession committed to human resource excellence.

The ODNI is proactive in establishing mandates for intelligence product evaluation based on sourcing requirements and use of the critical thinking process and structured analytic techniques.<sup>27</sup> In developing strategic intelligence analysis, analysts should always work through the following steps in formulating finished intelligence; issue identification; evidence diagnostics; hypothesis generation; and structured analytic techniques.<sup>28</sup> Strategic intelligence pioneer, Sherman Kent provided an insightful observation regarding the contribution of the strategic intelligence analyst, “Sound analytic tradecraft is the key to supporting the policymaking process without lapsing into policymaking. Information is rigorously evaluated for validity (countering Denial & Deception) and diagnosticity (managing “noise”). Estimative judgments are based on evaluated and organized data, substantive expertise, and sound, open-minded postulation of assumptions. Uncertainties and gaps in information are made explicit and accounted for in making predictions.”<sup>29</sup> It is the strategic intelligence leader’s responsibility to ensure senior leaders and other consumers of national intelligence

understand the rigor involved in developing our strategic intelligence assessments and how we coordinate and share them across the national intelligence community.

While building effective and efficient strategic intelligence team culture, teamwork and knowledge, we must ensure they are empowered to collect and share information and analysis seamlessly with other strategic intelligence agencies, operational and tactical intelligence organizations, appropriately caveated international partners, and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies. Guiding information sharing efforts are the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (ITRPA) of 2004. This legislation established the groundwork for information sharing in the post 9/11 era.<sup>30</sup> The legislation called for three initiatives: the establishment of an Information Sharing Enterprise (ISE), a program manager under the DNI to spearhead the ISE, and an Information Sharing Council to facilitate stakeholder buy-in. These organizational mechanisms were tasked to resolve information sharing shortfalls.<sup>31</sup> Key to the legislation's effectiveness is the intelligence communities' execution of the following core principles:<sup>32</sup>

- Effective information sharing comes through strong partnerships.
- Information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources.
- Information sharing must be interwoven into all aspects of counter-terrorism activity.

Through close collaboration and adherence of these key information sharing legislative measures, the credibility of our strategic intelligence analysis increases, which also increases the probability the analysis is considered in refining our national strategies.

## Conclusion

Building efficient and effective strategic intelligence teams does not require large amounts of fiscal resources, but does require increased leadership emphasis and involvement in our intelligence organizations. Priority of effort in the national intelligence community must be placed on strategic intelligence leadership, culture and intelligence analysis team building to create a professional and sustainable strategic intelligence capability. Increased emphasis on human resource programs designed to tailor and team cognitive skills and selected personality traits will decrease friction in the work place, increase the quality of analysis and motivate analysts and teams to excel. Analysts and teams will embrace the culture, share the strategic leader's vision and resuscitate the faith our senior leaders should have in their national intelligence capability.

To facilitate efficient and effective strategic intelligence teams, a collaborative information sharing environment must exist, encouraging intelligence partners and agencies at all levels of U.S. Government to share information, ideas and analysis without hierarchical stovepipes degrading the depth and timeliness of analysis. Flattened intelligence architectures are advantageous, but rigorous analytical practices and discipline must be applied by designated intelligence leaders at all echelons to determine which and how finished intelligence is provided to respective strategic intelligence audiences in order to support the national strategies of the United States.

While focusing effort on the strategic intelligence teams and information sharing, we must continue to validate the authorities, procedures and feedback mechanisms specified in our intelligence authorization and information sharing legislation. If effective oversight authorities for the ODNI are not resident in current legislation, we must

proceed with alacrity to modify existing legislation to create an environment which facilitates seamless strategic intelligence operations. With appropriate legislation in place, all strategic intelligence agencies and other U.S. Government agency partners must not allow individual agency interests to interfere with the larger national goal of providing cogent, credible and usable strategic intelligence to our nation's strategic leaders.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Carol E.B. Choksy, "Strategic Intelligence", course syllabus, Indiana University Bloomington, Bloomington, IN, Fall 2005.

<sup>2</sup> George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A FORECAST for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 4.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

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